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Equity’s intervention in family property disputes 
 
Ownership of the family home is usually not disputed until either the relationship 
between the spouses or cohabitants breakdown or there is a competing claim over 
the property by a third party. In such circumstances, determination of ownership 
rights becomes imperative. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 gives the courts 
adjustive powers to deal with disputes between spouses on the breakdown of the 
marriage.i Notwithstanding this, there may be circumstances where it will be 
necessary or desirable to determine property rights between spouses.ii Furthermore, 
the adjustive powers of the courts are not applicable to cohabitants. Thus, in the 
absence of legal co-ownership in the family home, cohabitants and spouses who 
cannot rely on the 1973 Act will have to establish an equitable interest in the 
property. The analyses relied on are primarily based on property law and trusts 
principles and, more particularly, imputed trusts and proprietary estoppel. Under 
trusts principles, imputed trusts are usually taken to refer to resulting and 
constructive trusts. 
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In dealing with disputes over ownership of the family home, the cases illustrate the 
tendency of the courts to blur the distinction between these two types of trusts. 
However, the historical origin of each is distinctly different. A resulting trust arises 
where, for example, title to the property is vested in A’s name but the consideration 
was provided by B. Unless a contrary intention is proved, the property will be held by 
A on resulting trust for B to the extent of his contribution.iii This causal connection 
between the financial contributions and acquisition of an equitable interest has been 
described as the ‘solid tug of money’.iv It becomes evident in the following discussion 
that the ‘solid tug of money’ is central in determining beneficial ownership of the 
family home. In contrast, constructive trusts have always been seen as arising by 
way operation of the law rather than the intentions of the parties. In the context of 
the family home, the courts have evinced a willingness to impose a constructive trust 
to prevent fraudulent or unconscionable conduct. Prior to Lloyds Bank v Rossetv, it 
was evident that two lines of authority emerged from the cases. The first line of 
authority, illustrated by cases like Gissing v Gissingvi and Pettitt v Pettittvii, was 
based on the ‘solid tug of money’, which followed closely the resulting trust analysis, 
in that, there had to be a direct referability between financial contributions and the 
acquisition of the property. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the prima 
facie inference is that it is the common intention of the parties that any contributions 
made towards the total purchase price of the property would entitle the party making 
the contribution to a proportionate share in the property. The second line of authority 
is found in cases like Eves v Evesviii and Grant v Edwardsix. The constructive trust 
is imposed on the grounds of ‘fairness’ or ‘justice’ which suggests the courts’ 
willingness to impose a constructive trust in situations where the claimant is able to 
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establish that the defendant has either explicitly promised to share the property or at 
least acknowledged in some way the intention to share and the claimant has, in 
reliance on this promise, acted to his or her detriment.x 
 
In Rosset, the defendant had made indirect contributions in the form of supervising 
building works and doing some redecoration on the husband’s property. She 
attempted to resist the bank’s claim on the grounds that, following Williams & 
Glyn’s Bank v Bolandxi, the bank was bound by her equitable interest under a 
constructive trust since they had failed to obtain her consent to the mortgage. The 
House of Lords, in dismissing the defendant’s claim, stated that a claimant may 
acquire a beneficial interest under a constructive trust only if two key elements are 
established: common intention to share and detrimental reliance. The claimant must 
establish the existence of an agreement, arrangement or understanding reached by 
the parties for the sharing of the property and that (s)he has acted to his or her 
detriment in reliance on such agreement, arrangement or understanding. In the 
absence of an express common intention, such intention may be inferred from the 
parties’ conduct. In that respect, direct financial contributions to the purchase price, 
whether initially or subsequently towards mortgage payments, would readily justify 
such an inference.xii It is, however, suggested that the common intention approach is 
inadequate in dealing with family property disputes primarily for two reasons. Firstly, 
Rosset reveals the inextricable ‘solid tug of money’ in founding a proprietary claim 
and shifts the emphasis back to financial contributions which are directly referable to 
the acquisition of the property. This is where a major weakness of the common 
intention approach lies. It fails to take into account the economic inequality between 
men and women which, in turn, affects their respective ability to acquire property. 
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This inequality is not just limited to the disparity of earnings between men and 
women but also affects women’s access to the family wealth. 
 
Secondly, the law fails to take into account the effects of sexual division of labour in 
these relationships. There is a close link between the sexual division of labour and 
women’s economic position. Thus, this paper sets out to highlight the fact that, 
despite its appearance of neutrality, the common intention approach is gender 
biased and effectively discriminates against female claimants. The paper will also 
look to the experiences of other Commonwealth jurisdictions in dealing with family 
property disputes. Whilst there is an excellent discussion by Gardner in respect of 
the Commonwealth approaches to family property disputesxiii, his analysis was not 
concerned with the issue of gender  in these disputes. The purpose of this paper is 
to show how gender issues should be taken into account when dealing with family 
property disputes and failure to do so by any doctrine applied renders it inadequate 
to protect the interests of female claimants. It becomes evident in the subsequent 
discussion that not all of the Commonwealth approaches are free from gender bias 
and have managed to escape the inextricable ‘solid tug of money’. The  study is, 
however, useful in elucidating options which may be less gender biased by their 
willingness to take into account indirect contributions, particularly domestic 
contributions, to ground proprietary claims. 
 
Limits of the ‘Common intention’ constructive trust 
 
Under the Rosset formulation, there are two ways in which a claimant may obtain a 
share in the family home. The first requires the existence of an agreement, 
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arrangement or understanding between the parties for the sharing of property, 
coupled with acts of detriment on the claimant’s part in reliance on such agreement. 
In the absence of such express agreement, the second alternative is to infer a 
common intention to share from the parties’ conduct. In drawing such an inference, 
the emphasis of the courts is on the direct financial contributions of the claimant 
towards the acquisition of the property. Rosset does not appear to affect the 
Gissing type of resulting trust. Its impact is felt more within the second line of 
authority where constructive trusts are seen as remedial in essence. In such 
situations, ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ alone appear to be insufficient grounds for the 
imposition of a constructive trust. Despite earlier authority wherein indirect 
contributions were recognised by the courts, the Rosset formulation gives little 
recognition to such contributions. Indirect contributions are excluded unless the 
claimant can show evidence of some notional common intention, that is, some 
express discussion or mention of property sharing between the parties. In such 
cases, the courts may be prepared to take into account indirect contributions if they 
are like those in Eves and Grant v Edwards. The factor which distinguishes those 
contributions from other forms of indirect contribution is that the courts perceive 
them as being contributions in money’s worth and capable of valuation in economic 
terms. In all other circumstances, it may be difficult to link other forms of indirect 
contributions to the acquisition of the property which justify the imposition of a 
constructive trust.xiv  
 
To some extent, Rosset has created a certain confusion about the type of trusts 
which the courts are dealing with in these disputes. In both instances, the courts 
have labelled them as constructive trusts. The first category, however, borders on an 
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express trust while the second, with its emphasis on direct financial contribution, 
appears to blur the distinction between traditional resulting trusts and constructive 
trusts. The detrimental reliance requirement, therefore, appears necessary for 
overcoming the formality of s 53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and for 
bringing the matter out of the ambit of traditional resulting trusts. The requirement, 
however, is in itself problematic as it is unclear what the exact nexus is between 
common intention and detrimental reliance. As a result, Rosset has been criticised 
on a number of grounds, the first of which is the common intention requirement. 
Rosset is less than clear on the level of evidence required for finding the requisite 
intention. This has led the courts to fictionalise the intent and make contradictory 
findings in some cases.xv Clarke argues that if the defendant finds some ‘excuse’ to 
fob off the claimant, this clearly evidences disagreement rather than agreement.xvi 
The contradictory findings of the courts effectively convert the unilateral intention of 
one party (the claimant) into an agreement. Gardner further argues that the courts’ 
willingness to stretch the facts so as to find the necessary common intention to 
share ends up being nothing more than an exercise in ‘inventing’ agreements.xvii 
This has led one judge to describing it as being a ‘phantom intent’.xviii  
 
Another criticism of Rosset stems from the requirement that, in the absence of an 
express agreement, the contributions must be financial and directly referable to the 
acquisition of the property so as to give rise to an inference of common intention. 
This condition effectively places little significance on indirect contributions even 
where such contributions are substantial. By ignoring indirect contributions, the main 
objection is that the principles effectively discriminate against women by making two 
basic assumptions.xix The first is that spouses and cohabitants are treated as 
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strangers dealing with each other at arm’s length, who will, therefore, ‘bargain’ for 
their respective shares over the family home. It imposes a commercial gloss to a 
relationship which is prima facie a personal one and the ‘bargain’ is interpreted as 
the first condition of common intention. The second assumption is that value cannot 
be attached to the domestic services provided by the claimant. The discriminatory 
effect of the law clearly manifests itself here, as it fails to take into account the 
effects of sexual division of labour in these relationships.xx  The typical family 
scenario of the husband being the only wage-earner and the wife being the full-time 
housewife and carer of the family is undoubtedly on the decline as increasing 
numbers of women join the labour market and are economically active. Despite this, 
it has been argued that this pattern, albeit less rigid than before, remains 
unchanged.xxi Women are still primarily responsible for the domestic duties in the 
family. In 1995, the Equal Opportunities Commission reported that the economic 
inequality of women to men was closely linked to women’s domestic 
responsibilities.xxii For example, 23 per cent of women in their late 20s were outside 
the labour market because of domestic responsibilities compared to virtually none 
(about less than 1 per cent) for men in the same age group. The proportions of 
women in their 30s and 40s who were also unemployed because of domestic 
responsibilities were 23 per cent and 12 per cent respectively whereas the 
proportions of men in each of the same age groups were about half.xxiii 
 
These assumptions render the effects of sexual division of labour remaining mostly 
invisible. In other words, the focus of the courts is on the claimant’s income-
generating activities and her domestic duties are incapable of giving rise to a 
common intention to share. The assumption of a domestic role clearly has a major 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 – 390’ 
- 8 - 
 
 
impact on the economic position of women. It affects their participation in the labour 
market, for example, the type of work and hours which they can take on and the 
wages which they can earn. This, in turn, affects their ability to make financial 
contributions towards the acquisition of property as these women will invariably have 
less or no economic resources of their own. Even where women are gainfully 
employed, the evidence suggests that women are generally less well paid than men. 
Morrisxxiv found that only 55 per cent of all women in the labour market were in full-
time employment. The average hourly wage of female full-timers was generally 
about 79.9 per cent that of male full-timers whereas the average weekly wage was 
72.3 per cent.xxv In comparison, the average hourly wage of female part-timers was 
about 60 per cent of male part-timers and 75 per cent of female full-timers.xxvi Morris 
argues that these findings reflect the overall weaker economic position of women. 
Thus, women’s lack of economic resources means that it is generally harder for 
them to compete on an equal basis as men in acquiring assets. This has led to 
Eekelaar's observation that ‘[a] woman’s place is often in the home, but if she stays 
there, she will acquire no interest in it.’xxvii In family property disputes, the effects of 
sexual division of labour are clearly linked to the direct financial contribution 
requirement. This raises two problems: firstly, the financial contributions must be 
directly referable to the acquisition of the property, for example, towards mortgage 
payments and secondly, where indirect financial contributions are made, they must 
be substantial and necessary to relieve the defendant’s income for repayment of the 
mortgage. It is unlikely that other forms of indirect contributions will suffice. 
 
Notwithstanding its appearance of gender-neutrality, it has been argued that the 
practical effect of the financial contribution requirement is to place men in a more 
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favourable position than women.xxviii Domestic services provided by women are 
generally disregarded by the courts as they refuse to see any connection between 
the provision of such services and the acquisition of the property. The combination 
of the ‘solid tug of money’ and the arm’s length dealing principle helps to reinforce 
the discrimination of women in these cases. Another argument often forwarded for 
rejecting domestic services is that such services are provided out of natural love and 
affection for the other family members. As such, these matters should remain 
unregulated within the private sphere of family. O’Donovan suggests that the 
deliberate non-interventionist approach of the state is merely a mask for passing 
control to other informal mechanisms. This private/public dichotomy allows domestic 
services to be ignored because they have no economic value in the public 
sphere.xxix  
 
A further argument raised is that the law fails to recognise the reality of domestic 
relationships. The arm’s length dealing principle runs diametrically opposite to the 
reality of such relationships. Gardnerxxx argues that any approach taken for the 
resolution of family property disputes which focuses on the parties’ thinking is 
inappropriate since the relationship between the parties is not one in which they 
would deal with each other by organised thinking in relation to their respective 
shares in the property. Furthermore, there is incongruity between judicial 
interpretation of the parties’ thinking and reality. Bottomley suggests that the cases 
indicate that the common intention requirement looks for specific evidence of the 
existence of a common intention rather than just mere expectation to share.xxxi She 
argues that the need for such specificity reflects not only ‘a requirement of 
jurisprudential approach but also a mode of reasoning and language use which is 
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more conducive to men than women’. The ‘language use’ in such relationships also 
reveals that women ‘too often read silence as positive assent and lack of specificity 
as covering a number of issues with equal firmness rather than evading the 
particular issue.’xxxii This suggests that the parties may actually have very different 
views about what it takes to make an agreement to share. It further illustrates the 
problems which women face unless they change their way of thinking.xxxiii 
 
The law further assumes that families function as egalitarian economic units 
whereby the parties have an equal say in both the allocation and management of the 
household income and decision-making. The parties can, therefore, ‘bargain’ for 
their respective shares in the property through the allocation of household income 
directly towards its acquisition. Any other form of allocation of the household income, 
especially the woman’s income, will draw the conclusion of a non-sharing intent by 
the parties. Pahl notes the strong correlation between control of household finances 
and marital power and that a family’s choice of management system is dependent 
on the household income level and who the main wage-earner is.xxxiv She found that 
management of household finances is clearly distinct from control. The partner 
viewed by the parties as being in control of the household finances normally plays a 
more dominant role in decision-making, which is directly linked to marital power.xxxv 
Low income families usually prefer the female-management system which places 
both management and control in the woman’s hands. In contrast, higher income 
families usually adopt a male-controlled system, even where the parties have opted 
for a pooling or an independent management system.xxxvi However, in low income 
families where finances are both female-controlled and managed, management is 
usually seen as a demanding chore rather than a source of power. In the absence of 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 – 390’ 
- 11 - 
 
 
any perception of control, these women rarely see themselves as participating in 
marital power. Pahl, therefore, concludes that the greater the woman’s contributions 
towards the household income, the greater her participation in decision-making and 
control over the household finances.xxxvii 
 
She further notes that the earning patterns of the parties and the choice of 
management system have a direct effect on the family’s spending pattern. The 
general tendency is to utilise the woman’s income for the day-to-day needs of the 
family, such as food for the family, clothing for herself and the children, rather than 
acquisition of assets.xxxviii In comparison, the man would usually be responsible for 
all other major bills, more particularly, repair and maintenance costs of the family 
home and mortgage payments. Utilising the woman’s earnings towards household 
expenses renders these contributions economically invisible since her earnings are 
ignored as pin money and absorbed into the household pool for covering family 
expenses and non-essentials. Such contributions, being classified as indirect, will 
not suffice to ground a proprietary claim under the current principles unless the 
woman is able to establish an existing agreement to share. 
 
A further criticism of the common intention approach lies in the link between 
common intention and detrimental reliance. Although the basis for establishing a 
beneficial share is clearly the parties’ common intention, that in itself is insufficient to 
make a claim successful. The courts may not necessarily be prepared to give effect 
to such intention in the absence of evidence that the claimant has acted on that 
intention in some way.xxxix Establishing the requisite nexus between common 
intention and detrimental reliance is, however, not an easy task, as can be seen 
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from the three contrasting approaches taken by the judges in Grant v Edwards. 
Nourse LJ adopted the ‘but for’ test which requires a causal connection between the 
agreement and the claimant’s acts in establishing the requisite detrimental reliance. 
Mustill LJ, on the other, took a contractual approach. The claimant’s acts must be 
referable in some way to the agreement reached between the parties, in that, the 
acts were carried out in exchange for a share in the property.xl The ‘joint lives’ 
approach taken by Browne-Wilkinson V-C appears to be the least stringent. Once 
the common intention is established, any acts carried out by the claimant towards 
the parties’ ‘joint lives’ will be treated as evidencing the requisite link. Given that the 
judges’ statements are obiter, it is difficult to state categorically which test is 
authoritative. 
 
This nexus question raises the further issue of what acts would suffice as 
detrimental reliance. This will depend on which test the courts will take in 
determining the issue. The narrower the test adopted, the higher the evidentiary 
requirements for establishing the requisite nexus between common intention and 
detrimental reliance and the acts which would justify the imposition of a constructive 
trust.xli The choice of test can also lead to differences in judicial construction of acts 
tantamount to detriment. The ‘but for’ test is more susceptible to value judgments by 
the judiciary regarding the type of activities which couples are reasonably expected 
to carry out in the course of a domestic relationship. In contrast, the contractual 
approach leaves greater autonomy to the parties to ‘bargain’ for which activities to 
be taken into account. The ‘joint lives’ approach appears to be the most flexible, 
allowing room for a wider range of activities to be taken into account as detriment.xlii 
It appears arguable that domestic services may be seen as sufficient acts of 
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detriment under the ‘joint lives’ test but not the other two tests. However, given the 
judicial attitude towards domestic services, it is unlikely that the courts will be 
prepared to recognise purely domestic services as being sufficient acts of 
detrimental reliance under any of these tests.xliii 
 
Recently in  Midland Bank v Cookexliv and Drake v Whippxlv, the Court of Appeal 
found, in each instance, that the claimant had made direct financial contributions 
towards the acquisition of the family home in the form of contributions towards the 
initial deposit. In Midland Bank v Cooke, the court stated that, in the absence of an 
express agreement to share and where the claimant has established an equitable 
share in the property through direct financial contributions towards the acquisition of 
the property, the whole course of conduct between the parties must be taken into 
account to determine the parties’ respective shares in the property. In that respect, 
assessment of the claimant’s share need not be limited to strict resulting trust 
principles and may be based on constructive trust principles. A similar approach was 
taken in Drake v Whipp. The upshot of these cases is that, once a sufficient direct 
financial contribution has been made so as to enable the courts to draw an inference 
of sharing intent and get a claim off the ground, there is wider discretion for the 
courts to take into account other forms of contributions, direct or indirect, as acts of 
detrimental reliance. It further appears that the courts have the discretion to ‘side-
step’ a strict resulting trust analysis and award a share to the claimant, which may 
be larger than her initial direct financial contribution, through a constructive trust.  
 
Given the constraints of Rosset, the outcome in both these cases is salutary in that 
it manages to mitigate the harshness of Rosset and the courts appear to evince a 
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willingness to see justice done in such cases.xlvi However, it is submitted that, 
despite the appearance of the courts’ willingness ‘to do justice’, both cases continue 
to illustrate the inextricable ‘solid tug of money’. The position remains that much 
depends on whether there has been a sufficient financial contribution to found a 
claim and even then, it remains unclear how much weight will be given to purely 
domestic contributions as acts of detrimental reliance. At first glance, Hammond v 
Mitchellxlvii may appear to be a case in point that the courts are manifesting a 
greater willingness to accept non-financial contributions as being sufficient acts of 
detriment for a claim to succeed. However, the claimant was able to establish the 
existence of a common intention and there is no indication of the court’s willingness 
to be overly generous in accepting indirect contributions as being sufficient acts of 
detriment in the absence of such express intention. It may be further argued that the 
provision of unpaid services in the plaintiff’s business and the claimant's support for 
his highly speculative business ventures were seen as sufficient acts of detriment as 
they were, to some extent, capable of being valued in economic terms.xlviii It is 
submitted that the case cannot be relied on as being authority for the proposition 
that the courts would be prepared to let a claim succeed purely on the basis of 
indirect contributions unless there is some notional agreement to share. 
 
A further problem of linking common intention with detrimental reliance is that the 
courts appear to treat the doctrines of constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel as 
interchangeable. At first glance, there seems to be certain similarities between the 
two doctrines. The requirement of agreement, arrangement or some understanding 
between the parties to share, coupled with the need for detrimental reliance, 
appears similar to the requirement of assurance, reliance and detriment in estoppel. 
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However, theoretically, there are two important distinctions between constructive 
trusts and proprietary estoppel. The first relates to the time of creation of the interest 
and secondly, the type of interest created. In constructive trust cases, once the 
requisite elements have been established, there is little discretion in terms of 
awarding shares in the property. It is an ‘all or nothing’ approach whereby the 
claimant receives what the parties had agreed to or was promised or nothing. In 
contrast, the courts have a wider discretion in estoppel cases to award a remedy 
which is the ‘minimum necessary to do justice’xlix and is not limited to a proprietary 
one.l Furthermore, common intention is required for the imposition of a constructive 
trust whereas the unilateral conduct of the defendant leading to an expectation of a 
share in the property on the claimant’s part is sufficient to ground an estoppel claim. 
Thus, detriment serves a different purpose in each case. This distinction is crucial 
and re-emphasises the importance of the proprietary nature of trusts in these 
disputes. In trust cases, detriment gives the claimant a proprietary interest which is 
enforceable against third parties, whereas detriment in estoppel cases is merely a 
factor which the courts take into account in deciding whether it would be 
unconscionable for the owner to resile from his assurance or encouragement and if 
so, the appropriate remedy to be granted. Until the court’s decision, the claimant has 
no interest in the property but only a mere equity.li 
 
The approach of the courts has evidenced a blurring of the distinction between 
constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel. Firstly, the common intention 
requirement is less stringent than it first appears. The courts have evinced a 
willingness to impose a constructive trust in cases where there is no evidence of an 
actual agreement to share but merely some assurance or even an excuse being 
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given to the claimant. Secondly, notwithstanding the purported ‘all or nothing’ 
approach, the quantification of the claimant’s share has become increasingly 
discretionary.lii This raises the question of whether the shift towards estoppel is 
desirable. Eekelaar observes that the common thread is that the claimant has been 
led in some way by the defendant to hold a reasonable belief that (s)he is to have a 
share in the property.liii He argues that estoppel is a more attractive alternative as the 
doctrine allows greater flexibility for domestic services to be taken into account as 
acts of detrimental reliance. 
 
Haytonliv has, on the other hand, argued in favour of the assimilation of constructive 
trusts with proprietary estoppel on the grounds that the theoretical distinctions 
between the two doctrines are illusory and the courts should stop ‘pigeon-holing 
circumstances into constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel’.lv The purpose of the 
court’s intervention is to protect the claimant’s detrimental reliance, rather than 
compel the other party to give effect to the expectation of a share. This entails 
assessing the parties’ relationship to ascertain whether there are circumstances 
which make it unconscionable for the defendant to assert his legal title absolutely.lvi 
With unconscionability as the underlying principle, Hayton argues that the courts will 
have greater flexibility to take into account both a wider range of contributions 
(including domestic services)lvii and remedies (personal and proprietary).lviii The 
constructive trust, being remedial in nature, has prospective effect and poses no 
threat to the existing rights of third parties. Whilst recognising the merits of this 
argument, Halliwelllix highlights that it remains unclear how receptive the courts are 
to the notions of unconscionability and unjust enrichment being the underlying 
principles of estoppel. This willingness does not appear to be evident across the 
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board.lx She notes that the approach of the English courts has become too rule-
oriented and ‘[c]oncentration on the rules may constitute as much a symptom as a 
cause.’lxi The courts have moved away from analysing the remedial aspects of trusts 
and considering the principles underlying equitable intervention. This may be 
partially due to the fact that, as the common intention analysis involves only two 
conditions, they have to be easily identifiable, thereby making the analysis less 
flexible, with less scope for looking into the facts of each case to decide whether 
relief should be granted. Consequently, domestic services are considered as 
insufficient acts of detrimental reliance.lxii Importing estoppel principles into 
constructive trusts may not necessarily increase the likelihood of success for the 
claimant who is relying solely on domestic services.lxiii This is where the link between 
common intention and detrimental reliance becomes significant. It remains 
necessary for the claimant to establish the requisite intention to share and a 
sufficient nexus between that intention and her conduct to qualify as detrimental 
reliance. 
 
The discussion so far shows that gender bias is evident in this area of the law. It 
remains invisible because the law recognises formal equality between the parties to 
own property. This is reflected by seemingly neutral concepts in the common 
intention approach, such as intention and the referability rule which emphasises 
financial contributions. Yet these concepts work in an insidious way to discriminate 
against women because they fail to take into account the effects of sexual division of 
labour on the earning capacity of women and how this will, in turn, limit their control 
and decision-making role in respect of the household finances. The evidence 
reveals that the trend is towards a male-controlled system, especially where the 
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man’s income is higher than the woman’s. Given the parties’ unequal access to the 
family wealth, women will generally find it harder than men to satisfy the 
requirements of the common intention approach. The significance of these 
arguments appears as well in the discussion on the assimilation of constructive 
trusts with estoppel. The main argument favouring assimilation is the flexibility of 
estoppel to take into account indirect contributions, especially non-financial 
contributions, as sufficient acts of detrimental reliance. Thus, by shifting towards 
estoppel, claimants may dispense with the onerous task of establishing the requisite 
common intention. However, it is submitted that an assimilation of  constructive 
trusts with estoppel will not remove the gender bias in the common intention 
approach unless the analysis is prepared to take into account how sexual division of 
labour and the economic disparity between men and women will impact on the type 
of contributions which each party can make towards the relationship. The purported 
flexibility of estoppel depends very much on a generous judicial treatment of non-
financial contributions as sufficient acts of detriment. 
 
The Commonwealth approaches 
 
It has been argued so far that the common intention approach is unsatisfactory as it 
places women at a disadvantage as a result of the effects of sexual division of 
labour in domestic relationships. This raises the question of what changes should be 
made in order to render the law less gender bias. Falling short of legislative 
intervention, it would appear that equity is still the more appropriate legal instrument 
to deal with family property disputes. However, in view of the arguments raised 
against the common intention approach, should the English courts emulate other 
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Commonwealth jurisdictions in adopting alternative doctrines to deal with these 
disputes? In reviewing the doctrinal bases of the Commonwealth approaches, 
Gardner came to the conclusion that those approaches were equally problematic as 
the common intention approach.lxiv The common thread in the various doctrines 
applied is the parties’ thinking which, Gardner argues, is inappropriate as parties in a 
domestic relationship normally deal with each other on the basis of trust and 
collaboration rather than organised thinking. He suggests that the principles to be 
applied in family property disputes should be reformulated to incorporate these 
values, thereby enabling the courts to obtain the desired results without the need for 
manipulating facts and fabricating common intention.  
 
It is, however, submitted that, if put to the test, trust and collaboration may be 
equally vacuous concepts, susceptible to value judgment by judges as to what types 
of conduct may be reasonably expected of the parties in a trusting and collaborative 
relationship so as to amount to detriment. This approach will not be too different 
from the quasi-marital approach which the courts are presently taking wherein 
redress is given to a claimant whom the court views as being comparable to the 
‘good wife’. Gardner’s analysis fails to take on the challenge of gender bias and its 
impact on the economic position of the parties. The discourse must take into 
account these issues in order for less gender biased principles to be formulated. 
Based on the empirical evidence of the effects of sexual division of labour and the 
economic disparity of men and women, the aim at this juncture is to investigate 
whether adopting all or any of the Commonwealth approaches will necessarily 
render the English law in this area more (or less) gender bias than the common 
intention approach. 
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(a) Australia – unconscionability 
 
The Australian courts have moved towards unconscionability as the basis for 
equity’s intervention. In Muschinski v Doddslxv, the court prevented the legal owner 
from unconscionably asserting full ownership and refusing to recognise the interest 
of the claimant who has made contributions for the purposes of the parties’ ‘joint 
endeavour’ which has subsequently failed. However, the facts of Muschinski v 
Dodds reveal that there was both a commercial and domestic element in the parties’ 
relationship which may have facilitated the finding of a joint endeavour by the 
parties. In Baumgartner v Baumgartnerlxvi, joint venture was extended to 
arrangements which were purely domestic. The claimant had made contributions 
which were both financial (in terms of pooled earnings) and non-financial (in terms of 
domestic services). There was further evidence that the pooled funds had facilitated 
the purchase of the property. The court found in favour of the claimant on the basis 
that the contributions were made for the parties’ joint relationship which has failed 
and that it would be unconscionable for the defendant to retain the benefit of those 
contributions. At first glance, this approach appears to give the courts greater 
flexibility in granting equitable relief than the common intention approach. It also 
appears to allow greater room for indirect contributions to be taken into account.  
 
However, Baumgartner has raised certain questions which remain unanswered. Is 
equitable intervention limited to situations which are analogous to Baumgartner 
where the parties have pooled their earnings or is it applicable to other forms of 
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unconscionable conduct? The cases give little guidance on the range of 
unconscionable conduct which will justify equity’s intervention. It remains unclear 
whether the principle is equally applicable to purely domestic contributions which 
have enabled the defendant to make savings and increase his assets since the 
unconscionability-based constructive trust has been imposed usually where the 
claimant has made substantial financial contributions to the defendant’s 
resources.lxvii Cases like Hibberson v Georgelxviii , Tory v Joneslxix and Public 
Trustee v Kukulalxx suggest that some sort of pooling of funds may be necessary 
for finding a joint endeavour. In Hibberson v George, there was no actual pooling of 
earnings but the claimant had made indirect financial contributions towards 
renovations and improvements of the property, the purchase of furniture and 
expenditure on the children. The court had stated that, although no strict pooling of 
resources is required, there must be at least some evidence of financial 
contributions being made towards the parties’ relationship. In contrast, the parties’ 
failure to pool their earnings was fatal to the plaintiffs’ claims in both Tory v Jones 
and Kukula. 
 
The strictness with which the courts interpret ‘joint endeavour’ suggests that the 
courts may be reluctant to impose a constructive trust solely on the basis of non-
financial contributions such as domestic services.lxxi Bryanlxxii argues that domestic 
services have generally been either devalued or ignored in later cases.lxxiii There is 
an evident shift in emphasis back towards assessing claims on the basis of financial 
contributions which he describes as ‘the materialist bias of Equity reassert[ing] 
itself’.lxxiv The approach appears only marginally more flexible than the common 
intention approach in its willingness to give greater weight to indirect financial 
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contributions in founding a claim. There are, however, remnants of gender bias in 
the unconscionability approach. In requiring some evidence of commercialism in the 
relationship, it ignores the impact of sexual division of labour on women’s 
employment and earning patterns. Non-financial contributions, such as purely 
domestic contributions, will probably be insufficient to satisfy the ‘joint endeavour’ 
requirement and for the imposition of a constructive trust. 
 
(b) Canada - unjust enrichment 
 
The Canadian courts have similarly moved away from the common intention 
approach and adopted unjust enrichment as the underlying basis for the grant of 
equitable relief. Following cases like Pettkus v Beckerlxxv and Sorochan v 
Sorochanlxxvi, the unjust enrichment approach requires the establishment of three 
requirements: an enrichment to the defendant, a corresponding deprivation to the 
plaintiff and an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment. Once these elements 
are present, a constructive trust will be imposed, provided that there is a causal 
connection between the unjust enrichment and the property under dispute. The fact 
that one party has benefited at the instance of the other party is not in itself sufficient 
to warrant the court’s intervention. There must be evidence to indicate that the 
retention of the benefit will render such enrichment as ‘unjust’ in the circumstances 
of the case.lxxvii In Pettkus v Becker, the claimant made financial contributions 
towards the parties’ living expenses and provided unpaid labour in the man’s bee-
keeping business while the claimant in Sorochan had provided both domestic 
services as well as unpaid farm work. The court in Sorochan had, in fact, made no 
distinction between the claimant’s domestic contributions and her farm labour and 
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held that the defendant had benefited from both types of labour which had been 
performed by the claimant without remuneration. It was, therefore, recognised that 
domestic services could equally enrich the owner of the property.  
 
This proposition was endorsed in Peter v Beblowlxxviii where domestic services 
performed by one partner in the relationship was treated as an incontrovertible 
benefit and are capable of raising the presumption of an enrichment, which the 
claimant has been deprived of in the absence of adequate compensation. As 
cohabitants are not under any common law, equitable or statutory requirement to 
provide such services, the presumption is that the services are not being given 
gratuitously. Accordingly, there is an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment 
and a corresponding deprivation.lxxix The causal connection need not be in the form 
of the claimant’s direct financial contributions towards the acquisition of the property. 
Thus, the causal test is a more general one and is satisfied so long as there is a 
clear link between the contributions and the disputed property. More importantly, the 
approach does not place greater significance on financial contributions over 
domestic contributions. 
 
The unjust enrichment formulation further refers to the reasonable expectations of 
the claimant and the state of mind of the owner of the property. Thus, the owner 
must know, or ought to have known, that the contributions were not made on the 
basis of a gift but with a reasonable expectation of a share in the property. The 
reasonable expectation requirement has been criticised by Gardnerlxxx as a retreat to 
the parties’ thinking and manipulation of facts by the courts to find the relevant 
expectation and absence of juristic reason for the enrichment. Scane, on the other 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 – 390’ 
- 24 - 
 
 
hand, argues that the reasonable expectation requirement appears to act in a purely 
evidentiary way to raise the presumption that the services are rendered by one 
partner in a relationship tantamount to spousal, for the benefit of the family or the 
business of the other partner, with an expectation of some form of economic 
compensation.lxxxi Once the claimant establishes that the relationship is one 
tantamount to spousal and that she has made contributions (whether direct or 
indirect), the combination of these two factors raises the presumption and shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant to show that he had no knowledge of the claimant’s 
expectation. This is arguably very different from the common intention requirement 
which needs some form of meeting of minds by the parties. The reasonable 
expectation calls for no such meeting of minds and may be purely unilateral in its 
formation. It is submitted that this presumptive role does not differ substantially from 
Gardner’s trust and collaboration in domestic relationships which, likewise, raises 
the presumption of shared benefit. 
 
A further problem raised is the nexus between the causal connection and the 
claimant’s reasonable expectations. In LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona 
Resources Ltdlxxxii, the court recognised the significance of a proprietary remedy 
when monetary compensation is inadequate. The imposition of a constructive trust 
will depend on whether there exists any reason for giving the plaintiff additional 
rights over the property which necessarily flows from awarding a proprietary remedy. 
Even then, there must be a proprietary link between the unjust enrichment and the 
property to justify such an award. The basis of the unjust enrichment analysis 
appears to be two-fold: firstly, the claimant’s mistaken belief that, in supplying 
domestic services, she will acquire a share in the property and secondly, the 
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defendant’s acquiescence in ‘freely accepting’ the contributions made by the 
claimant.lxxxiii This appears to exclude situations where the defendant has made his 
non-sharing intention clear to the claimant. It may, therefore, be argued that the 
claimant’s continued provision of domestic services is done without the reasonable 
expectation of sharing the property. This argument has been rejected on the 
grounds that, despite communication of the defendant’s refusal to share, the very 
nature of these relationships is such that the claimant will probably continue to 
provide the services when faced with the risk of losing more from the deterioration of 
the relationship than what may be gained from withdrawing the services. Thus, the 
continued provision of the services cannot be seen as being ‘voluntary’ and should 
not be a bar to a restitutionary remedy.lxxxiv This proposition appears to be supported 
by Sorochan where a constructive trust was imposed, despite the defendant having 
communicated his non-sharing intent to the plaintiff. This suggests that the 
reasonable expectation requirement is a minimal one and that a defendant may not 
be able to raise a defence to a proprietary claim by merely warning off the 
claimant.lxxxv 
 
This leaves a gap in the unjust enrichment analysis as to the necessary ‘proprietary 
link’ between the unjust enrichment and the property to justify a proprietary remedy. 
The necessary link between causal connection and reasonable expectation may, 
however, be easily satisfied by the presumptions raised in favour of the claimant and 
it will be increasingly harder for a defendant to resist a proprietary claim. Unlike 
commercial cases where the emphasis is on the causal connection and inadequacy 
of monetary compensation, the courts’ treatment of family cases appears to be more 
generous. They evince a greater willingness to impose a constructive trust, despite 
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the  absence of a clear proprietary link to any particular asset of the defendant. The 
difference in treatment in domestic cases may be justified on two grounds.lxxxvi 
Firstly, the nature of domestic relationships requires the causal connection 
requirement in domestic cases to be less stringent than in commercial cases. 
Secondly, while the parties in a commercial transaction assume a certain level of 
risk, the acceptance of risk in domestic relationships is generally absent. Thus, the 
courts’ willingness to grant a proprietary remedy stems from the reasonable 
expectations of the parties that the contributions are being made towards the joint 
relationship, thereby entitling the claimant to a share in the property. This willingness 
may also be partially due to the fact that the courts recognise the remedial nature of 
the constructive trust in these cases, which will not affect the prior claims of third 
parties. 
 
By taking into account domestic contributions, it has been suggested that the unjust 
enrichment approach is a more realistic acknowledgement of familial relationships 
as a common enterprise.lxxxvii Each member contributes to the relationship according 
to his or her abilities and the needs of the other members of the household. If the 
relationship subsequently breaks down, the property ought to be distributed 
according to these contributions, whether direct or indirect, financial or non-financial. 
Criticisms of gender bias brought about by sexual division of labour and the weaker 
economic position of women in terms of making direct financial contributions and/or 
the allocation of the household income towards the acquisition of the property are 
markedly reduced if the doctrine provides greater scope for the recognition of 
indirect contributions, especially domestic services. The reduced gender bias in the 
unjust enrichment approach is in part facilitated by the presumptive role that 
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reasonable expectations play. Notwithstanding this, the unjust enrichment approach 
is not completely gender neutral. 
 
At present, the focus is on relationships which are ‘tantamount to spousal’. This 
qualification raises two problems. The first relates to identifying relationships which 
will qualify. This will necessarily entail the courts’ evaluation of relationships and 
deciding whether they are sufficiently ‘marriage-like’ so as to come within the scope 
of the doctrine. This poses a factual difficulty for the courts and the tendency will be 
for the courts to look at long-standing relationships as being more worthy of the 
courts’ protection than relationships of shorter duration. Factors such as the duration 
of the relationship, the presence or lack of presence of children, the usage of the 
same family name and having a joint account may influence the courts in deciding 
that a particular relationship qualifies.lxxxviii The courts are equally susceptible to 
value judgments in determining whether the relationship is sufficiently spousal-like. 
Unless the claimant can pass this first hurdle, the issue of her contributions being an 
unjust enrichment does not even arise. 
 
The second problem is whether the analysis will apply to other types of relationships. 
The couples in all these cases are heterosexual and the courts have consistently 
referred to relationships tantamount to spousal. It remains to be seen whether the 
courts will be prepared to extend this principle to other relationships, for example, 
homosexual couples or couples who share a household but do not have a sexual 
relationship. The unjust enrichment approach will be of limited effect if the courts 
continue to make a distinction between relationships which they perceive as being 
spousal-like and those which are not. In that respect, the common intention 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 – 390’ 
- 28 - 
 
 
approach, despite its criticisms of gender bias, may be a more flexible approach with 
its ability to include a wider range of relationships. 
 
(c) New Zealand - reasonable expectations 
 
Gillies v Keoghlxxxix paved the way for the ‘reasonable expectations’ approach 
which the New Zealand courts have adopted in dealing with family property 
disputes. In Gillies v Keogh, there was evidence that, throughout the relationship, 
the defendant had made it clear to the plaintiff that she viewed the properties as 
being her own. Consequently, the court found in favour of the defendant on the 
basis that there had been no reasonable expectations on the part of the plaintiff 
which justified the court’s intervention. The court observed that the common thread 
in these cases is the reasonable expectations of the parties. In formulating these 
expectations, the courts will have to consider certain factors. The first is the ‘degree 
of sacrifice made by the claimant’, which may include ‘opportunities foregone’. This 
is also used as a yardstick in assessing the unjust enrichment of the defendant. 
Secondly, the court will consider ‘the value of broadly measurable contributions of 
the claimant by comparison with the broadly measurable value of the benefits 
received’. In that respect, the court recognised that contributions towards the 
household expenses and food and other domestic services may have little 
significance and may at times be treated as being no more than a fair exchange for 
free board and lodging. It is also clear that the parties may ‘contract out’ of the 
reasonable expectations approach, as in Gillies v Keogh. 
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The approach, therefore, appears to incorporate both a subjective and an objective 
component in determining the parties’ reasonable expectations. The objective 
component centres on whether a reasonable person in the claimant’s position would 
have expected an interest while the subjective component involves the claimant 
formulating an expectation to share. In Phillips v Phillipsxc, the court recognised 
that a long-standing de facto relationship and the conduct of the parties are equally 
capable of giving rise to reasonable expectations of property sharing as in marriage. 
In Lankow v Rosexci, the court reiterated that the imposition of a constructive trust 
would be justified only if the claimant has established four essential elements: that 
contributions, whether direct or indirect, have been made towards the acquisition, 
preservation or enhancement of the defendant’s assets or property; that (s)he 
expected an interest in the property; that the expectation was reasonable in the 
circumstances; and the defendant should reasonably be expected to give the 
claimant an interest. The court further stated that there had to be a causal link 
between the claimant’s contributions and the acquisition, preservation or 
improvement of the property. The contributions need not be financial but must fall 
into one of two categories. Firstly, the contribution of itself must assist the defendant 
in the acquisition, preservation or enhancement of the property or its value. 
Alternatively, the contribution by its provision must assist the defendant in acquiring, 
improving or maintaining the property or its value. In that respect, domestic 
contributions may qualify as contributions towards acquisition of the home. However, 
the contributions must manifestly exceed the benefits received. In other words, the 
claimant must show that (s)he has suffered some detriment or that the contributions 
have resulted in the enrichment of the defendant which is unjust. This is where the 
New Zealand courts have reiterated the fundamental difference between de facto 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Legal Studies 18 (3), pp 369 – 390’ 
- 30 - 
 
 
relationships and marriage. The presumptive half share adopted in legal marriage 
does not apply in de facto relationships. Therefore, the remedy of a constructive 
trust is based on a clear causative link being established between the claimant’s 
contributions and the property in dispute and the appropriate share to be awarded is 
dependent on the balancing of contributions made and benefits received. 
 
Although the cases illustrate that the courts do not intend to limit qualifying 
contributions to purely direct and financial contributions, they also reveal two major 
limitations. Firstly, the weighing up of contributions against benefits received may 
render the remedy ineffective on a practical level. The courts are faced with the 
difficult task of determining the point at which the contributions actually outweigh the 
benefits received so as to qualify. This is particularly problematic in cases of purely 
domestic contributions. If the courts are conservative in their valuation of such 
contributions, the net result of the balancing act will effectively reduce the share to 
be awarded to the claimant. Even where financial contributions are made, the 
balancing act is not necessarily an easier task. Given that women are generally in a 
weaker economic position, their contributions are constrained by their own economic 
resources. Thus, a mathematical calculation of contributions versus benefits would 
render the approach equally as biased as the common intention approach.  
 
The other more pressing problem is the ability of the parties to contract out of the 
reasonable expectations approach. In Cossey v Bachxcii, the court stated that the 
expressed intentions of the parties remain paramount. Once the defendant has 
made it clear to the claimant, as in Gillies v Keogh, that (s)he is not to acquire a 
share in the property, the claimant can no longer be said to continue holding a 
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reasonable expectation. The expressed intention has to be unequivocal, made by 
the party who has the power to dispose of the interest in question and pertinent to 
the circumstances of the case. The defendant’s expressed intention will effectively 
override the claimant’s reasonable expectation and allow the defendant to avoid 
having a constructive trust fixed on him. The ramifications of such an expressed 
intention is felt most in cases of domestic contributions. For the same reasons raised 
by Scane in relation to the unjust enrichment approach, it may be difficult for women 
in such relationships to withdraw their domestic contributions. At the same time, the 




The above analysis shows how the common intention approach raises problems 
which renders it inadequate to deal with family property disputes. The main objection 
is the need to find the relevant common intention to share which is rarely found in 
majority of domestic relationships. This has led some to argue that the process of 
awarding a proprietary remedy depends on the willingness of the courts to 
manipulate the facts in order to find the relevant intent. A further problem of the 
approach is its emphasis on the referability rule which focuses on direct financial 
contributions rather than all forms of contributions, whether direct or indirect, 
financial or non-financial. The principles clearly ignore the effects of sexual division 
of labour in such relationships which place women at a disadvantage. The 
approaches taken by various Commonwealth jurisdictions have, firstly, moved away 
from the common intention approach and, secondly, evinced greater willingness to 
take into account indirect contributions and, more particularly, non-financial 
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contributions such as domestic services, in deciding whether to grant a proprietary 
remedy. The discussion on the Commonwealth approaches reveal that some 
approaches have evinced greater willingness than others in recognising indirect 
non-financial contributions in getting a proprietary claim off the ground. However, 
none of the approaches are not completely problem-free.  
 
The joint endeavour approach in Australia continues to manifest remnants of the 
‘solid tug of money’ by emphasising the need for the pooling of resources which 
inevitably requires some form of financial contributions from the claimant. This may 
be difficult in cases of women who are constrained by their domestic responsibilities 
in taking on employment and making the requisite contributions. In both New 
Zealand and Canada, the courts have stated that the contributions need not be 
solely financial, thereby allowing non-financial contributions to be taken into 
consideration. This is a marked departure from the conservatism shown by the 
English courts. The willingness of both the Canadian and New Zealand courts to 
recognise the significance of non-financial contributions such as domestic services 
reveals the fallacy that no value can be placed on such services. It may be of 
interest to note that an independent study by Legal & General reveals that the 
average value of domestic services is about £16,265 per year.xciii However, there are 
two caveats on the generosity of the reasonable expectation approach in the form of 
the contributions/benefits equation and opting out. Each may be an effectively 
barrier to relief especially in cases where women are providing purely domestic 
services. The Canadian approach appears to offer the greatest flexibility in terms of 
recognising indirect contributions, especially domestic contributions. Yet, the 
approach remains problematic if the courts place too rigid an interpretation of the 
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types of relationships which fall within its scope. At present, the cases point to 
relationships which tantamount to spousal. This exposes the assessment of 
deserving cases to value judgments by the courts and may limit the applicability of 
the doctrine only to relationships which the courts view as being spousal-like and 
more deserving of protection. Thus, even where the claimant has made substantial 
indirect contributions, a short-lived relationship may be viewed as less deserving of 
protection than a long-standing one. 
 
Even where the courts are prepared to recognise indirect contributions, it remains a 
difficult matter in determining the form and duration of such contributions which 
would suffice in justifying a share in the property. It is no doubt easier to argue that 
the claimant who has cared for the family over a twenty year period is obviously a 
more deserving case than one who has been in a relationship for six months. On the 
other hand, if the claimant in the latter relationship has made substantial indirect 
financial contributions, it becomes harder to define hard and fast rules for assessing 
eligibility and entitlement. However, this is where the open-texturedness of the 
equitable doctrines come into play. The principles should be flexible enough to allow 
room for each case to be assessed on their merits. It is doubtful whether concepts 
like trust and collaboration are necessary to add coherence to this area of law. The 
Commonwealth approaches show how non-financial contributions need not be such 
a black box in terms of grounding a proprietary claim. They reveal how doctrines 
dealing with family property disputes may be better formulated to accord with the 
reality of domestic relationships and to take into account the continued existence of 
sexual division of labour and the economic inequality between men and women in 
these relationships. Thus, the Commonwealth approaches reveal two important 
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points. Firstly, equitable principles may be formulated  which are more receptive to 
the economic disparity of men and women, in the resolution of family property 
disputes and secondly, that the contributions made by a female claimant need not 
be limited to only financial contributions and that the courts are competent in placing 
some value on non-financial contributions. 
 
Part of the problem of the common intention approach may be as stated by Halliwell. 
In searching for legal clarity, the English courts may have become too rule-oriented 
as reflected by the rigid interpretation of Rosset and, in particular, the requirement 
for direct financial contributions. Once the courts recognise that the common 
intention approach need not be dictated solely by the refereability rule, it allows 
greater flexibility for the courts to take into consideration a wider range of 
contributions, direct and indirect. The courts’ assessment should incorporate 
consideration of the whole course of conduct between the parties, as well as the 
effects of sexual division of labour in the relationship and how that may impact on 
the claimant’s resources in terms of making contributions, whether direct or indirect, 
towards the relationship. By re-focusing on these issues, it may pave the way for a 
principled basis of deciding family property disputes which is less gender bias. 
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